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ESSAY
UNIVERSITY DONS AND WARRIOR
CHIEFTAINS: TWO CONCEPTS OF DIVERSITY
Thomas H. Lee*
INTRODUCTION
By deciding in Grutter v. Bollinger1 to "endorse Justice Powell's
view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions,"2 the Supreme Court
has ended one debate but invited another. The burning question
whether Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke' is binding on the point4 is now moot. Nor is it
open to doubt that an affirmative-action policy with diversity as its
end can survive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.5
But just how far the diversity rationale can justify race-based policies
in educational and non-educational contexts is certain to be a focus of
future cases and controversy.6
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., A.M., J.D., Harvard.
I thank George Cochran, Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming, John Jeffries, Tracy Higgins,
Jim Kainen, Ken Karst, Alexandra Lee, Maria Marcus, Henry Monaghan, Russ
Pearce, Aaron Saiger, and Ben Zipursky for comments, Andrew Sparkler (Fordham
Law '05) for able research assistance, and Fordham Law School for a summer writing
grant. Errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. Id. at 2337.
3. 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) ("[T]he attainment of a diverse student body ...
clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.").
4. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
("Justice Powell's opinion.., provides the governing standard here."), and Smith v.
Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Thus, at our level of
the judicial system Justice Powell's opinion remains the law."), with Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he fact is
inescapable that no five Justices in Bakke expressly held that student body diversity is
a compelling interest under the Equal Protection Clause."), and Hopwood v. Texas,
236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding the same).
5. No State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. In light of the Court's companion holding in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2411, 2427-28 (2003), striking down the University of Michigan's undergraduate
admissions policy for lack of individualized inquiry to achieve the compelling interest
in diversity, the question of narrow tailoring will also be much contested.
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This Essay proposes a framework for clarifying the diversity
rationale in Grutter. The Court itself gave the first clue. It is not the
mere fact of student body diversity that is the compelling interest, but
rather "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body."'7 This formulation, however protean, does suggest a
substantive doctrinal test when viewed in conjunction with the Grutter
Court's analysis of the compelling interest in diversity. Such a
"benefits" test would turn on three elements. A compelling state
interest exists when the university (1) identifies "the educational
benefits that [student body] diversity is designed to produce;"8 (2)
shows that attaining those benefits is "essential to its educational
mission; ' and (3) makes a showing that a diverse student body "will,
in fact, yield [those] educational benefits."'"
This Essay proposes that there are two distinct categories of
educational benefits of student body diversity and that there is
marked variation in the extent to which higher educational institutions
seek to and in fact confer the two sorts of benefits. Accordingly, the
compelling interest test as formulated in Grutter should, by its own
terms, take account of this variation in mission and causation, with the
logical consequence that student body diversity might not suffice as a
compelling government interest in every higher educational context.
The first type of educational benefits of student body diversity is
what I shall call "discourse" benefits. There are benefits to students,
the university, and society arising from the discourse and interactions
all students will have on a racially diverse academic campus.1 Racial
diversity at the university "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps
to break down racial stereotypes,... enables students to better
understand persons of different races... [and produces] classroom
discussion [that] is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting."12  The discourse benefits of student
body diversity also include benefits that are "educational" not in the
sense of "pedagogical" or pertaining to the educational setting, but in
the different yet seemingly valid sense of lessons learned at school
applied to society and life at large. 3
On the other hand, there are benefits to society when minority
students are graduated from the few highly selective "gate-keeping"
7. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 2339.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.; see also Jack Greenberg, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining
"Diversity" in Education: Diversity, the University and the World Outside, 103 Colum.
L. Rev. 1610, 1618-19 (2003).
12. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40 (internal citations omitted).
13. "[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them
as professionals." Id. at 2340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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schools that employ race-based admission programs (only twenty
percent of the nation's colleges and universities) 4 and assume
professional positions of leadership in nationally sensitive, non-
educational institutions like the military officer corps, 5 "major
American businesses,"16 Congress, 7 and the federal judiciary. 8
Leadership diversity is in turn a compelling need for a racially diverse
society. In articulating the logic of what I shall call the "leadership"
benefits of student diversity, the Court was not, as it purported, simply
"endorsing" Justice Powell's Bakke opinion."9 Rather, the Grutter
Court was adopting an altogether different reason to find diversity a
compelling interest in the higher educational context.
The Court was powerfully influenced in this regard by an amicus
brief filed by twenty-nine retired military officers and civilian leaders
of the U.S. armed forces.2" The military leaders argued that "based on
their decades of experience, a highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its princip[al]
mission to provide national security."21 The military's claim was that
the military academies and Reserve Officers Training Corps
("ROTC") programs at civilian colleges sought diverse student bodies
because students will automatically become leaders of the armed
forces upon graduation and a diverse officer corps is essential to
14. See William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River 15 & n.1 (1998);
Daria Witt et al., Introduction to Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on
Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities 9 & n.4 (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds.,
2003) (citing regression analysis indicating that "only the top 20 percent of colleges
and universities have an admissions policy that employs a significant degree of racial
preference").
15. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2341.
18. Id.
19. Accord Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative
Action, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 60 (2004) ("The Grutter opinion... justif[ies]
affirmative action for a purpose Justice Powell had not mentioned.").
20. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 1787554 [hereinafter
"Military Brief"].
I served, in 1994 and 1995, as a U.S. naval cryptology officer on the personal
staff of one of the amici, Admiral Archie Clemins, who was then Commander, U.S.
Seventh Fleet. This Essay does not reflect the views of Admiral Clemins.
The leadership diversity argument of the Military Brief was importantly
supported by amici briefs filed by prominent American corporations, which made the
same point as to American economic power. See, e.g., Brief of General Motors
Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2325 (2003), Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-231, 02-516),
2003 WL 399096, at *23-*24; Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses
in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-231, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056, at *1.
21. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Military Brief, supra note 20, at *5)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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national security. The Court accepted that "'it requires only a small
step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other most
selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective.' ' 22
The selective military academies represent the strongest case for the
gate-keeping leadership benefits of student body diversity. Liberal
arts colleges represent the strongest case for diversity's discourse
benefits. The Court casually assumed that all civilian universities with
race-based admissions policies, including colleges, likewise stake a
persuasive claim to leadership benefits,23 but this is a questionable
assumption for three reasons. It is debatable, first, because unlike
military academies and professional schools, selective colleges do not
claim that specialized professional training, even in an institutional
leadership capacity, is one of their principal educational missions.
This is unlike the exchange of ideas among diverse students, which is
at the "very core" of their educational mission.24 Second, in America
today, those who seek leadership in nationally essential institutions
must increasingly obtain further training at graduate and professional
schools25 that do seek to provide such tailored training, and this
necessarily dilutes the causal claim of undergraduate institutions to
leadership benefits. Third, with the exception of the officer corps, the
individuals and electorates who appoint such leaders have complete
discretion in choosing minority and other candidates, including the
freedom to disregard whether he or she was admitted and completed
an undergraduate program of study at an elite school. This further
dilutes the causal claim of top civilian colleges to leadership diversity
benefits. Prestigious colleges may supply a disproportionate share of
the nation's leaders, and they may claim that they mold leaders in a
broad sense, but correlation is not causation and generalized
aspiration is not educational mission.
This leads to an interesting question: If institutional leadership or
professional benefits are not central to the mission of elite
undergraduate schools, and student body diversity at these schools
does not cause these benefits in a meaningful way, i.e., in a way
comparable to the gate-keeping military academies and specialized
graduate and professional schools, is it still a compelling government
interest in light of the many direct and indirect benefits of diverse
22. Id. (quoting Military Brief, supra note 20, at *29).
23. Id. at 2341.
24. Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-
241), 2003 WL 402236, at *28-*29 (discussing law school's mission) [hereinafter
Grutter Respondents' Brief]; see also Brief for Respondents, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 402237, at *21-*26 [hereinafter Gratz
Respondents' Brief]; Neil L. Rudenstine, Student Diversity and Higher Learning, in
Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action 38-39 (Gary
Orfield ed., 2001); infra Part II (comparing educational mission statements of highly
selective military academies and similarly selective civilian colleges).
25. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 14, at 91; infra Part II.
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discourse on campus, which is the core of their mission? The question
appears to be settled as a doctrinal matter. The Court in Gratz v.
Bollinger, relying on Grutter, summarily accepted that student body
diversity at the University of Michigan's College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts, was a compelling government interest.26
But I am not so sure that this was right, both on the terms of the
Grutter "benefits" test and as a matter of education policy. The
robust exchange of diverse ideas on campus is certainly essential to
the elite colleges' educational mission. But if, because of the benefits
of diverse campus discourse, student body diversity is a compelling
state interest for the twenty percent of the nation's colleges that use
affirmative action, then surely it must be so for the eighty percent of
colleges that do not. And affirmative action, to the extent it ensures
that our most selective colleges, as a class, can enroll the "highly
qualified" minority students that they could not have admitted but for
race-based policies, would necessarily set back the compelling interest
in student body diversity at non-elite colleges as a group. The bottom
line is that absent a claim to gate-keeping leadership benefits, the elite
colleges' claim to compelling interest in student body diversity (for
discourse benefits alone) stands on shaky ground.
The first part of this Essay describes the discourse benefits of
student body diversity. The second explains the contrasting logic of
leadership benefits. The third part summarizes how different
educational institutions seek to and bring about one sort of benefit
and/or the other.
I.
What I have called "discourse" benefits are the core "educational
benefits" of student body diversity, and they are, unsurprisingly,
grounded in "the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment." 7 The premise is that the
university is a special First Amendment community, whose
fundamental mission is the "robust exchange of ideas."28  The
university's administrators, as the moderators of this community, may
exercise within a roomy but reasonable zone of discretion "the right to
26. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003) ("Petitioners ... argue
that diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply too open-ended, ill-
defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting
narrowly-tailored means. But for the reasons set forth today in Grutter v. Bollinger,
the Court has rejected these arguments of petitioners." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
27. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
28. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)
(Powell, J.)).
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select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust
exchange of ideas.' 29
This is just what the university has done in implementing race-based
admissions policies. It has made an "educational judgment '3° that the
presence of certain minority students who would not be enrolled but
for affirmative action is "essential to its educational mission "31 of
promoting discourse on campus. There is evidence that the fact of
being a minority affects a person's life experiences and the
conclusions she draws from them. 32 "[T]he presence of persons who
have had such experiences enriches the educational environment, if
only because it is human nature to undervalue or fail to see burdens
that we haven't truly experienced ourselves. ' 3  This sort of sharing
occurs not only in the classroom, where a variety of backgrounds will
make discussion "livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening
and interesting,"' but through the myriad informal interactions that
take place on campus.35 In order to ensure that minority perspectives
are not reduced to single voice-in-the-wilderness stereotypes, it is
necessary to admit minority groups in sufficient numbers ("a critical
mass") to impart the confidence to speak out and to stay faithful to
differences within the groups.36
The Court, while relying on the "countervailing constitutional
interest1 37 of the university's free-speech rights, did not speak of
particular doctrines and otherwise remained noticeably vague on the
issue of deference on First Amendment grounds. Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, fairly called the majority to task on the
29. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 2341 ("Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own,
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race
unfortunately still matters."); Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *22-*24;
Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *25 ("Racial and ethnic diversity is
educationally important because, notwithstanding decades of progress, there remain
significant differences in our lives and perceptions that are undeniably linked to the
realities of race.").
33. Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *24. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at
312-13 n.48, where the then-president of Princeton University, commenting on the
benefits of a diverse student body, noted: "People do not learn very much when they
are surrounded only by the likes of themselves."
34. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (citations omitted).
35. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48.
36. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. The Court noted:
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on any belief that
minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue. To the contrary, diminishing the force of
such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one
that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
37. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
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point.38 An attempt at specification may help in understanding why
the Court deferred to the university's judgment that the discourse
benefits of student body diversity were compelling enough to validate
a race-based admissions policy.
Three different free-speech doctrines seem relevant as analogies-
lines of cases concerning public fora, the government as subsidizer of
speech, and the government as educator. Public-forum doctrine
allows the state to impose conditions on speech occurring on certain
public property so long as its regulation is not content-based. As a
subsidizer of speech, the government may "encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest" 39 provided that it does
not discriminate based on viewpoint.40 As educator, the government
is allowed leeway in how it manages the educational setting, even
when it exercises considerable editorial discretion over student
speech.4
No case has ever held, nor did the University of Michigan and its
friends argue, that the university campus is itself a public forum 42 and
my point is not that it should be. Rather, the public-forum rubric is
important as an analogy. A basic intuition behind the doctrine43 is
that the government has an obligation to permit and protect a robust
exchange of ideas in public parks, streets, and sidewalks-traditional
venues accessed typically by those lacking the wherewithal to
publicize their ideas by other means.' Restrictions on under-
resourced speech in public fora-just like censorship of it-would
snuff out the desired communication for all time, to the detriment of a
38. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350, 2357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
39. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
40. See id.
41. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) ("The
principal's decision ... was reasonable under the circumstances as he understood
them."). Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (high school cannot discipline students who wore black armbands to protest
Vietnam War), with Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,685 (1986) (high
school can discipline student for "offensively lewd and indecent speech").
42. Cf Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 (high-school newspaper not a public forum);
S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (community theater a
public forum).
43. Another premise of the doctrine-more clearly associated with the restriction
on content-based regulation in public forums-is equal access: Once the government
has set up a public forum, it cannot pick and choose the content of the speech that will
take place, although it may engage in regulation of the forum for reasons unrelated to
speech, such as public order and safety. Just as the norm of equal access, however
problematic its application to cases may be, compels content-neutrality in avowedly
non-speech regulation that the government may undertake, the state's promulgation
of affirmative action for the sake of all the "educational benefits" of a racially diverse
student body (not just the First Amendment-associated discourse benefits discussed
in this part) does not on its face disadvantage any specific content in the campus
exchange of ideas.
44. Cf. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
2004] 2307
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democratic society whose legitimacy lies in the responsiveness of the
political process to the voices of all of its citizens. This idea of basic
access to the marketplace of ideas, made imperative by the implicit
risk of non-substitutability by transmission in another medium, is an
enduring First Amendment theme that has appeared in contexts other
than public fora.45
The analogy applies to the university affirmative-action cases in a
straightforward way. Without affirmative action, there would not be
enough "under-represented minorities" on elite campuses to ensure
an accurate communication of minority student perspectives in the
university marketplace of ideas, just as, without the provision and
protection of public fora, the voices of under-resourced citizens might
similarly go unheard. The "token numbers"46 of certain minorities in
the student body that would result from a race-blind admissions
process might refrain from speaking without the safety and moral
support of numbers,47 or be stereotyped by the majority when they
do.48 Campus exchanges, absent affirmative action, would accordingly
be an imperfect marketplace of ideas,49 unfaithful to the multi-racial
democratic society that the university is seeking to serve, in the same
way that freedom of speech would be a sham if under-resourced
citizens with no other options were denied basic access to public fora.
Or the Court may have been thinking about the First Amendment
right of the state as subsidizer of speech. The government in this
capacity may promote a desired activity-such as cross-racial
discourse-so long as it does not discriminate against certain
viewpoints." The University of Michigan and its friends went to great
lengths to point out that their affirmative-action programs did not
discriminate on the basis of the viewpoints held by the minorities who
benefited.5 In fact, the idea of the "critical mass" envisions the
45. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) ("Residential signs are an
unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of
modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical
substitute.").
46. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
47. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) ("Their
small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students
themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their
potential.").
48. See Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *28 ("Put bluntly, teaching
that not all blacks think alike will be much easier when there are enough blacks
around to show their diversity of thought." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
49. See Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational Effects of Racial Diversity on
Campus, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action 179
(Gary Orfield ed., 2001).
50. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); cf Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832-33 (1995).
51. See, e.g., Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *30 (noting that the
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selection of minority students of various viewpoints, to cancel
stereotypes and to be faithful to variation of views within the minority
group.52
The idea of the government as educator is not so different from the
vision of it as subsidizer of speech; the main difference being the
greater degree of deference owed to the state when it is actually
running the educational enterprise. The basic premise is that public
schools are allowed discretion in going about their educational
missions, indeed, in defining those missions, even when the result is
the substantial restriction or elimination of student speech. Although
the case law acknowledging this deference developed in the context of
high-school students whose countervailing free-speech rights might
plausibly be more curtailed than those of adult university students, 53
the state as educator in our case is using affirmative action to
encourage speech, not to restrict it, albeit exerting editorial discretion
by promoting a certain kind of race-inflected speech.
The distinction between deference to the state as subsidizer of
speech and the greater deference due to it as educator in its own right
logically gives rise to a distinction in compelling government interest
analysis between public and private universities. On the one hand,
when the state or federal government is educator, it may have to look
to the benefits of the public-education enterprise as a whole, whether
state or nationwide, rather than to what is best for a particular public
school in the system 4.5  By contrast, the private institution of higher
learning necessarily formulates its compelling interests more narrowly
in terms of what is good for itself. Accordingly, to the extent that
affirmative action at elite public universities promotes diversity on
those campuses at the cost of racial diversity at other less prestigious
Law School's need for a critical mass of minority students is not based on a "belief
that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue").
52. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003). Of course, viewpoint
neutrality in fact would be contingent on existing diversity of viewpoints in the
minority group-if, for example, ninety-five percent of the minority group hold a
"progressive" viewpoint, then theoretical neutrality between progressive and
conservative views would be a near-dead letter.
53. See cases cited supra note 41.
54. Cf. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350, 2354-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (arguing that Michigan does not have a compelling state interest in
maintaining an elite law school); id. at 2348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia explained:
I find particularly unanswerable [Justice Thomas's] central point: that the
allegedly 'compelling state interest' at issue here is not the incremental
'educational benefit' that emanates from fabled 'critical mass' of minority
students, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school
whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and
other minorities.
2004] 2309
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schools in the state, the compelling state interest test should take
account of the trade-off.
To be accurate, when a public university uses affirmative action to
promote the exchange of ideas on campus, it does engage in a form of
content-based, viewpoint discrimination, in tension with the doctrines
of public fora and the state as subsidizer of speech. That is to say, the
university is making a judgment that ideas shaped by minority racial
experiences have an especially high value in the campus exchange of
ideas, as compared to, say, ideas influenced by religious,
socioeconomic, or ideological differences. The transmission of such
ideas should accordingly be subsidized by race-conscious admission
policies. This is where the Court's insistence on deference to the
"Law School's educational judgment that diversity is essential to its
educational mission"55 appears to lean very heavily on the discretion
of the state as educator-with respect to a university's threshold
determination that racial diversity should be privileged over other
sorts of diversity in campus discourse.5 6 It follows naturally that a
school-for instance a historically black college-might within its
discretion choose not to privilege racial diversity at all, if based on a
good-faith judgment that a diverse student body was not essential to
its educational mission, even though other schools think it a
compelling interest. 7
II.
I have sought so far to describe a universal, discourse-focused
argument that universities as a class make about why the state's
interest in a diverse student body is compelling. The "robust
55. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329 (majority opinion).
56. Professor Abner Greene has made the same conclusion in the broader context
of government speech and subsidies of speech in non-educational contexts.
"Government both may and should promote contested conceptions of the good,
through direct speech acts and through funding private speech with conditions
attached." Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 68-69
(2000). While I can afford to remain agnostic on the generalized point (i.e., assuming
away the crutch of educational institutional deference) for the purposes of this Essay,
I find his argument compelling both as a lens for understanding the doctrine and as a
normative, neo-Platonic conceptualization of the state's purpose.
57. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350, 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) ("The majority grants deference to the Law School's assessment that diversity
will, in fact, yield educational benefits. It follows, therefore, that an [historically black
college's] assessment that racial homogeneity will yield educational benefits would
similarly be given deference." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see
also Rudenstine, supra note 24, at 38 ("[I]nstitutions may choose on their own to take
less account of race, ethnicity, and gender in admissions .... "). Another place where
deference to the university (as educator) does special work concerns the actual
numerical determination of the "critical mass of underrepresented minorities"
necessary to achieve the compelling government interest in diversity, but that is more
a question of narrow tailoring. Compare Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342-44 (majority
opinion), with Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2310 [Vol. 72
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exchange of ideas" is the core of the university's mission. Student
body diversity promotes campus exchange of ideas informed by race
and, as a result, imparts an appreciation of racial diversity that will
reverberate even after school through life at large. These
"educational benefits" are documented by evidentiary studies.58 Such
benefits are central to a university's conceptualization of its
educational mission, the pedagogical strategies it chooses to
accomplish that mission, and, ultimately, its underlying First
Amendment rights. Consequently, the university is entitled to
deference in its decision to privilege race-inflected discourse over
other types of idea exchange by deploying a race-conscious admissions
policy.
One plausible post-educational discourse benefit of student body
diversity, which Justice Powell mentioned in his Bakke opinion, was
the exposure of future leaders to diverse discourse on campus.
Quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,59 he noted that "[t]he Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection."60
His implicit assumption was that a university education was necessary
to attain a position of national leadership. Consequently, any
discourse benefits delivered by a university education would be
reflected in the attitudes and qualifications of the leadership class,
regardless of the racial make-up of that class. That is to say, the
discourse benefit to national leadership can, in theory and logic, be
realized without actual leadership diversity. This second-order
discourse benefit is very different from the concept of the leadership
benefit which the Court adopted in Grutter.
The difference between discourse benefits to leadership arising
from student body diversity and the concept of the direct leadership
benefit might be made clearer by thinking of ideological diversity,
which confers a similar sort of discourse benefit. Indubitably, an
exposure to Karl Marx's philosophy of history at the university,
including interaction with Marxist scholars and student organizations
like the Spartacus League will benefit a student's understanding of
various social, economic, and political issues. And that enhanced
understanding may very well make students who achieve positions of
national leadership after graduation better leaders. It is quite a
different thing to say that ideological diversity requires that we have
some Marxists in leadership positions that require university
education as a qualification.
To reiterate this important point, Justice Powell's concept of the
58. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (majority opinion).
59. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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diversity benefit to leadership concerned the inculcation of a
particular mindset-one of toleration of difference, and it can be
found as much in a racial majority as in a racial minority. This
diversity is of course not the same as the leadership diversity claim in
Grutter, which depends on minority participation in leadership for
satisfaction.
Justice Powell's exclusive focus on discourse benefits might be
explained in part by the art of the possible: It may have been
impossible in 1978 to conceive of robust leadership diversity of the
sort that seems possible today. I would like to think as well that the
difference might be attributed to Justice Powell's divergent vision of
the diversity norm. He appears to have believed that making
presumptions about race was wrong, whether the presumption was
that minorities will behave toward minorities in a certain way if in
positions of leadership,61 or, more relevantly, that minorities in the
general population would regard minority leaders, irrespective of their
views on racial issues, more favorably than majority leaders with
mindsets open to racial diversity. His fear of resultant tokenism was
prescient, as witness the trend to ideologically conservative minority
appointments to leadership positions, such as federal judicial
appointments, which seemingly deploy the candidates' race to insulate
ideological viewpoints that do not fairly represent the views of
minorities at large. The distressing presupposition of such
appointments would appear to be that minorities in the general
population will blithely accept them as indicative of meaningful
leadership diversity, without regard for the decisions that they will
likely make as leaders on their behalf.
In Grutter, the Court endorsed a subtly, but importantly, different
claim from Justice Powell's discourse benefits rationale. Diverse
discourse on campus and its societal reverberations notwithstanding,
student body diversity at a particular educational institution is sought
to produce, and in fact produces, not just racial-majority leaders who
are open to diverse perspectives, but actual and substantial racial
diversity in the leadership ranks of important non-educational
institutions.62 As Justice Breyer put it during oral argument to counsel
for petitioner Barbara Grutter:
[Almong other things that they tell us on the other side is that many
people feel in the schools, the Universities, that the way-the only
way to break this cycle [of minority impoverishment and under-
schooling] is to have a leadership that is diverse ... you have to train
a diverse student body for law, for the military, for business, for all
61. Cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11. Justice Powell rejected the view that black
doctors would have a greater tendency to serve poorer communities. Id.
62. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325; see also Karst, supra note 19, at 67 ("The services'
affirmative action aims to ensure the inclusion of minority officers in all levels of the
officer corps, and thus to improve the services' performance.").
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the other positions in this country that will allow us to have a diverse
leadership in a country that is diverse.63
The Court was clearly influenced by the military brief in this belief.
The military amici convincingly defended the affirmative-action
policies of the military service academies and ROTC programs-the
truly unique context in which diverse undergraduate student bodies
do automatically produce racial diversity in the leadership ranks of a
nationally essential non-educational institution. And, as the Court
noted, the military leaders argued that "based on their decades of
experience, a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps... is
essential to the military's ability to fulfill its princip[al] mission to
provide national security."'
The military brief was delivered, like a precision-guided munition,
under circumstances certain to maximize its effect. Grutter was
argued on April 1, 2003. That same day, poignantly, the very junior
officers discussed in the abstract by the military brief were putting
their lives at risk for their country in Iraq, with the outcome of the war
much in doubt.65 Americans did not feel safe even at home in the
wake of the September 11 bombings and the persistent threat of more
terrorist attacks. Unlike the civilian proponents of affirmative action
in the case, these amici were of the warrior class, many politically
conservative. Deference to the military was particularly likely given
that the Court itself comprised men and women of limited familiarity
with the twenty-first century military institution and specifically its
professional officer corps.66
63. Oral Argument Transcript, Grutter (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1728613, at *13; see
also Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 ("[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders."). The
Court cited Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950), in support of this statement,
see Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341, but the passage quoted made the distinguishable point
that law school is a "proving ground for legal learning and practice".
64. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (emphasis added) (quoting Military Brief, supra
note 20, at *5).
65. See Rick Atkinson, As Battle Escalates, Holy Site Is Turned Into a Stronghold,
Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 2003, at Al ("The assault is proving problematic for the Army,
which finds itself entangled in precisely the sort of urban combat that military
planners hoped to avoid."); John F. Bums, Warning of Doom, Edgy Iraqi Leaders Put
on Brave Front, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2003, at Al ("The Iraqi leadership put on a show
of redoubled defiance today and promised American troops nothing but 'death in the
desert,' [even as American forces advance towards Baghdad.]"); Josh Friedman,
Stocks Tumble on War, Economy Fears, L.A. Times, Apr. 1, 2003, at C6.
66. Five Justices never served in the U.S. armed forces (Justice Scalia did attend
St. Francis Xavier School in New York, which was a Catholic military high school at
the time). Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist were enlisted draftees, and
Justice Kennedy was a California National Guardsman. Justice Stevens, who was
commissioned out of a wartime officer-candidate program, had experience in the
Second World War (as a naval cryptology officer) in a navy that was very different
from the U.S. naval service of today. Nor did any of the Justices have law clerks that
term who had served in the officer corps. (Interestingly, three of the thirty-five law
clerks during the prior 2001 Term did serve as active-duty line officers during the
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It is clear from the record and the majority opinion in Grutter that
the military brief was, in the apt word of one esteemed commentator,
a "showstopper. 6 7 The Court quoted extensively from the military
brief in its analysis of the compelling interest in student body
diversity.' During the oral argument in Grutter, the Justices referred
repeatedly to the military brief,69 at one point referring to it as "Carter
Phillips's brief," despite the fact that Mr. Phillips, a former law clerk
to Chief Justice Warren Burger and counsel of record on the military
amicus brief, was not himself allotted any argument time, to the
apparent perplexity of those who were.7°
The military brief's argument was clear and simple. It is important
to have a racially diverse student body at selective military academies
and ROTC programs because students are commissioned as junior
officers, the front-line leaders of the armed forces, on the day they
graduate.7' Our enlisted ranks have many minorities (including 21.7%
African-Americans, 9.6% Hispanic, 1.2% Native Americans),72 and it
1990s: a naval aviator, a naval cryptology officer, and a marine communications
officer.)
67. James M. O'Neill, Supreme Court Experts Say Affirmative Action Looks Safe,
Justices Focus on Military Briefs, Colum. Chron., Apr. 14, 2003 (quoting Columbia
Law Professor Samuel Issacharoff who called the military brief "a showstopper" that
"impressed on the court the significance not only of the legal principles at stake but
the broader social impact of a poorly thought-out decision."), available at
http://www.ccchronicle.com/back/2003-04-14/campuslO.html; see Charles Lane,
Affirmative Action for Diversity is Upheld: In 5 to 4 Vote, Justices Approve U-Mich.
Law School Plan, Wash. Post, June 24, 2003, at Al; James M. O'Neill, Court Upholds
Use of Race in Admissions: Mich. Point System, Viewed as a Quota, Is Struck Down,
Phila. Inquirer, June 24, 2003, at Al ("[L]egal experts said that the military brief was
a masterful stroke .... ); David G. Savage, Court Affirms Use of Race in University
Admissions, L.A. Times, June 24, 2003, at Al.
68. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
69. See, e.g., Oral Argument Transcript, Grutter (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1728613,
at *7 ("Mr. Kolbo, may I call your attention ... to the brief that was filed on behalf of
some retired military officers who said that to have an officer corps that includes
minority members in any number, there is no way to do it other than to give not an
overriding preference, but a plus for race." (Justice Ginsburg to Mr. Kolbo, on behalf
of petitioner Barbara Grutter)); id. at *9-'10 ("[T]he question is whether without
the-the weighting of race that they do in fact give, they can have an adequate
number of minorities in the academies to furnish ultimately a reasonable number of
minorities in the officer corps, that's the issue, isn't it?" (Justice Stevens to Mr.
Kolbo)); id. at *12 ("Well, let me ask you this, it's about the military brief that you
didn't come here to argue about, but it will maybe get you back to your case." (Justice
Kennedy to Mr. Kolbo)). Indeed, well over half of Mr. Kolbo's argument time, id. at
*7-'17, of 15 total pages, was taken up by questions regarding the military brief.
70. Id. at *19. The oral argument proceeded as follows: "General Olson, just let
me get a question out and you answer it at your convenience. I'd like you to
comment on Carter Phillips's brief. What is your view of the strength of that
argument?" Oral Argument Transcript, Grutter (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1728613, at
*19 (Justice Ginsburg to Solicitor General Theodore Olson after the words "First, it
is"). General Olson's initial response was: "Well, I'm not sure." Id.
71. Military Brief, supra note 20, at *12-'13.
72. Id.
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is necessary for good order and discipline that they see highly
qualified officers of color in positions of leadership. 3 We know this is
true based on evidence from the troubled history of race and the
military institution in this country,74 and, in any event, second-guessing
the military's own prediction for what is necessary to perform its
mission poses an unacceptable risk to our national security in perilous
times.75
The brief continued: "It requires only a small step from this
analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective
institutions must remain both diverse and selective. Like our military
security, our economic security and international competitiveness
depend upon it."76  The Court accepted this "small step" without
question;7 7 my basic point here is to question it.
A useful starting point to understanding the difference between
why the military seeks student body diversity and why its civilian
counterparts do is to compare what each sort of institution asserts as
its educational mission. West Point's mission is:
[t]o educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each
graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the
values of Duty, Honor, Country; professional growth throughout a
career as an officer in the United States Army; and a lifetime of
selfless service to the nation. 8
The Naval Academy seeks to give "young men and women the up-
to-date academic and professional training needed to be effective
naval and marine officers in their assignments after graduation. ' 79 It
seeks a few good men and women with a certain mentality and
ambition: "If you have a strong will to achieve, desire a real
challenge, and want to be a leader serving your country, the
opportunity of a lifetime could begin for you at the United States
Naval Academy."8 Similarly, the Air Force Academy aims high to
"[i]nspire and develop outstanding young men and women to become
Air Force officers with knowledge, character and discipline; motivated
to lead the world's greatest aerospace-force in service to the nation."81
73. Id. at *14-*17.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *17-*18, *29.
76. Id. at *29-*30.
77. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) ("We agree that '[i]t requires
only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective
institutions must remain both diverse and selective."' (internal citations omitted))
78. United States Military Academy Mission Statement, available at
http://www.usma.edu/mission.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
79. United States Naval Academy Mission Statement, available at
http://www.usna.edu/about.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
80. United States Naval Academy Admissions, available at
http://www/usna/edu/Admissions/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
81. United States Air Force Academy Mission Statement, available at
http://www.usafa.af.mil/misvis/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
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Compare those statements with representative samples from three
highly selective civilian colleges with similar acceptance rates to the
military academies. s2  In line with their more generalist and
intellectual approach, none of these civilian institutions have
articulated a "mission" per se. A former president of Williams
College described its institutional purpose thusly:
The most versatile, the most durable, in an ultimate sense the most
practical knowledge and intellectual resources which... (-an now be
offered are those impractical arts and sciences around which the
liberal arts education has long centered: the capacity to see and feel,
to grasp, respond and act over a widening arc of experience; the
disposition and ability to think, to question, to use knowledge to
order an ever-extending range of reality; the elasticity to grow, to
perceive more widely and more deeply, and perhaps to create; the
understanding to decide where to stand and the will and tenacity to
do so; the wit and wisdom, the humanity and the humor to try to see
oneself, one's society, and one's world with open eyes, to live a life
usefully, to help things in which one believes on their way. This is
not the whole of a liberal arts education, but as I understand it, this
range of goals is close to its core.83
And a former president of Williams's archrival Amherst once
remarked:
A university or a liberal arts college, quite apart from any religious
affiliations, is pledged to a special faith of its own. It believes first
that men and women can live together in a community where they
teach and learn from each other .... A good college seeks not
merely a coterie of the like-minded, to reinforce convictions already
formed, but seeks out every vein of talent and opinion from every
possible background, so that from the ferment of ideas freely
exchanged it can advance to new conclusions.84
Brown University's website provides:
The goal of the Brown Curriculum is for students to work toward a
liberal education, in which students learn the knowledge and ways of
thinking of a range of academic disciplines, in which they practice
habits of self-reflection and empathy for others, and in which they
82. The 2003 acceptance rates were: twelve percent for the United States Naval
Academy, thirteen percent for the United States Military Academy, seventeen
percent for the United States Air Force Academy, seventeen percent for Brown
University, eighteen percent for Amherst College, and twenty-three percent for
Williams College. US News & World Report, America's Best Colleges 2004 Lowest
Acceptance Rates, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/brief/webex/lowacc-brief.php
(last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
83. Williams College Mission and Objectives (quoting President John E. Sawyer's
1961 Induction Address), available at http://www.williams.edu/admin-
depts/registrar/geninfo/mission.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
84. Amherst's Philosophy (quoting Peter R. Pouncey, President 1984-94),
available at http://www.amherst.edu/aboutamhl philosophy/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
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are challenged to articulate and examine the moral convictions that
will guide them through life.85
Nor, for that matter, can civilian undergraduate colleges, or indeed,
any civilian institution of higher learning, assert the sort of robust
causal claim that the military academies can-that diverse student
bodies will necessarily cause leadership diversity in the target
institution. The military service academies and officer training
programs are unique gate-keeping institutions insofar as they are a
sufficient conditions6 for direct entry into leadership of an important
public institution-the officer corps of the nation's armed forces.87
Indeed, in functional terms, the military academy case provides the
rare circumstance in which a racially diverse student body equals a
racially diverse leadership group in a nationally sensitive non-
educational institution: Ninety-nine percent of graduates from the
academies are commissioned as active-duty military officers.88 It
seems fair, therefore, to conclude that if the compelling government
interest at issue is "obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse
student body," one should include in the calculus for the national
military academies the "benefit" of leadership diversity in the armed
forces.
No civilian institution of higher learning, however prestigious, can
claim to be a true gate-keeper in the sense of being a sufficient
condition for entry into the leadership cadres of public or private non-
85. Brown University, Statement of Dean of the College, available at
http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Dean of-the-College/DOC/s2_browncurricul
urn/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
86. They are not a necessary condition because officers may also be commissioned
through ten-to-fourteen week post-undergraduate officer candidate schools and
enlisted commissioning programs. In my experience as a naval officer, however, I
perceived that minority officers who are commissioned out of the military service
academies command a special respect from the enlisted ranks because academy
graduates have traditionally formed the backbone of the professional officer corps. It
is, in this sense, a particularly poignant statement about the fairness, openness, and
legitimacy of leadership access for enlisted to see minority officers commissioned out
of the highly selective service academies.
87. As a mark of their importance to the nation, all commissioned officers have
their commissions signed by the President of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 3 (authorizing that the President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United
States"). Moreover, many military academy graduates put their training to use to
become civilian leaders in industry and government after completing their service
obligations, which augments the academies' claim to general national leadership
benefits.
88. The service academies permit cadets and midshipmen to resign after the
second year without incurring an active-duty service obligation. Officer candidates in
ROTC programs can resign after their first year without incurring a service
obligation. Those who drop out after that point must serve an enlisted tour or risk
prosecution, unless it is determined that there was a compelling reason in which case
authorities may permit repayment of scholarship monies with interest. All who
graduate are commissioned as officers and serve some active duty, absent a medical
or other exception rarely granted.
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educational institutions of the sort that the Court mentioned in
Grutter-state governorships,89 the United States Congress,9° the
federal judiciary,9' and "major American businesses."'  There is no
such thing as a State Governors' School, a U.S. Congress academy, a
federal judge academy, or a corporate chief executive officer
("CEO") academy,93 to which anyone with qualifications can apply
and acceptance to which guarantees a gubernatorial mansion, a
Senate or House seat, a federal judgeship, or a CEO job upon
graduation.94
Of course, certain professional and graduate schools, notably the
selective law schools and business schools, do seek to groom
institutional and professional leaders, and can also empirically claim
disproportionate access by graduates to prominent non-educational
institutions that would perform better with racial diversity in their
leadership ranks. The Court pointed out that "[i]ndividuals with law
degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half
the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the
seats in the United States House of Representatives."95 The Court
continued that "[t]he pattern is even more striking when it comes to
highly selective law schools. A handful of these schools account for 25
89. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2340. To be fair, junior military officers, which is what the academies
and ROTC programs are principally preparing their graduates to be (with training for
command billets provided by war colleges and the like), are not really national-level
leaders like Senators, governors, Article III federal judges, and major CEOs. Rather,
junior officers are unique in that they are community-level leaders of a nationally
essential institution. But the Court neglected to develop this point, analogizing
instead to national-level civilian leaders. If the military analogy is to have full play,
integration below the pinnacle of national leadership at the community level might
also be a compelling interest. Speculation in that direction is beyond the scope of this
Essay, the intent of which is to add some precision and rigor to the legal analysis
explicitly articulated by the Court in Grutter, in the hope of guiding future discussion.
93. Many leading business schools have "advanced management programs" that
provide short-term (e.g., three-week) training programs for senior private and public
executives. The role of such programs, however, is not to impart essential
professional training, but rather to facilitate networking and familiarization with
academic scholarship on useful subjects of currency and interest. They are, in this
sense, more like social "finishing schools" than true gate-keeping institutions.
94. The FBI Academy and state police academies are similar to the military
academies in terms of sufficiency for entrance into an institution benefited by racial
diversity in composition, but they are not undergraduate, graduate, or professional
schools in the common sense. Nor are they the sort of nationally prominent
institutions the Court seems to have had in mind when talking about leadership
diversity. The analysis of affirmative action in those contexts, then, should turn on a
direct analysis of diversity as a compelling interest in the non-educational
institution-the FBI or the state police as appropriate-without couching it in terms
of the gate-keeping "educational" institution. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
95. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
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of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States courts of appeals
judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States district
court judges."96 Modesty likely prevented the Court from observing
that the same "handful" accounted for all nine of its Members.97 We
might add that ten more state governors have advanced degrees
(including five MBAs);98 thirty more Senators have JD's from law
schools other than the "handful" the Court had in mind and at least
twenty-two others have advanced degrees (including six MBA's and
one medical degree ("MD")).99 And at least sixty-three of the CEOs
of the top 100 companies in the Forbes 500 have some sort of
advanced degree (twenty-five MBA's; nine JDs; one MD). 1°°
Indeed, a law degree is a prerequisite to become a federal or state
judge, prosecutor, or defense lawyer-legal sub-institutions in which
racial diversity would seem to be highly desired given the
disproportionate numbers of minorities who are victims, perpetrators,
and litigants in the American justice system. Consequently, the Court
in Grutter was correct, in my view, to have factored the educational
benefit of leadership diversity in its compelling-interest analysis as to
the University of Michigan Law School"' (albeit in a weaker form
than in the military-academy context). The Court's implicit
acceptance of the same conclusion as to the University's college,1"
however, is a different matter.
In today's America, bachelor's degrees, even from the most elite
colleges, no longer command a leadership gate-keeping role, in large
part because graduate and professional degrees have become so
common.10 3 While there are 1,995 schools that confer undergraduate
degrees, there are presently an astonishing 1,499 educational
96. Id.
97. Among the nine Justices: Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer were
graduates of Harvard Law School; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
were graduates of Stanford Law School; and Justice Stevens received his law degree
from Northwestern, Justice Thomas from Yale, and Justice Ginsburg from Columbia.
98. Governors of the United States Biographical Information, available at
http://www.nga.org/governors/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
99. Senators of the United States Biographical Information, available at
http://www.sentate.gov/generallcontactinformation/senators-cfm.cfm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2004).
100. For the Forbes 500 companies, see Forbes 500 List (Mar. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.forbes.com/lists/. For the educational background of CEOs, see Standard
& Poor's Biographical Register, available at
http://web.westlaw.com/welcom/company-information/.
101. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
102. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
103. Empirical research might illuminate the validity of this conclusion. For
instance, one might design a multivariate regression model to assess the causal effect
of a degree from a selective undergraduate college as compared to other variables
such as graduate education and institution, socio-economic background, work
experience and so forth. My guess would be that such analysis might reveal a
statistically significant coefficient for a very small class of super-elite colleges, such as
Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford.
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institutions that confer master's degrees too, 535 of which also grant
doctorates,10 and, on top of that, 188 law schools accredited by the
American Bar Association. According to 2000 U.S. census data,
28,317,792 of the nation's population twenty-five years and over have
a bachelor's degree only; 16,144,813 have an additional advanced
degree. 10 6  A former president of Harvard University and noted
education-policy expert summed it up nicely:
An excellent undergraduate education is an enormous advantage in
life. But we know that a college degree, by itself, is increasingly seen
as inadequate preparation for many careers for which it once
sufficed. Graduate training has long been necessary for aspiring
doctors, lawyers, educators, scholars, research scientists, and clergy;
in today's world, advanced degrees are also seen as highly desirable,
if not essential, for many other callings, including leadership
positions in business, public affairs, and the not-for-profit sector.10 7
Nor is specialized job training, even in a leadership capacity-to be
a military officer, a corporate executive, a judge, a politician, or even a
non-profit administrator-a principal mission of the typical elite
undergraduate institution. (I discuss in Part III, infra, a non-specific
leadership production function that top colleges do claim-that they
mold leaders of the nation in a general way.) Unlike the military
academies, top civilian colleges do not require students to take classes
in leadership, leadership ethics, small-team tactical leadership, or
great military and political leaders of the past. The vast majority of
elite colleges, in the liberal arts tradition, do not supply this sort of
vocational training in how to be a leader so common to the military
classroom, as they are more concerned with teaching students how to
think critically in a generalist way, with one's "major" more a matter
of emphasis than specialization.108 Of course elite colleges-indeed all
undergraduate programs-encourage participation and leadership in
student organizations and sports teams,10 9 but such activities are
understood to be extracurricular, that is to say, voluntary and
unrelated to what is taught and expected to be learned in satisfaction
of degree requirements.
104. Fall Enrollment, 1999 Survey, available at
http://nces.ed.gov//programs/digest/d01/dt210.asp.
105. Number of Law Schools, available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/approved.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2004).
106. 2000 U.S. Census, available at
http://factfinder.census/gov/servlet/Basicfactsservlet/.
107. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 14, at 91.
108. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
109. See Don Oldenburg, Tippy-Top Secret. Yalies Bush and Kerry Share a
Patrician Past of Skull and Bones, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 2004, at D1 (Yale President
Richard Levin often "referred to Yale as 'a laboratory for leadership.' Aside from
the university's acclaimed academic life, Yale provides undergrads a wealth of
opportunities to lead. Registered on campus are 250 student organizations.").
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As a final attempt to understand the difference between leadership
and discourse benefits, it may be helpful to engage in a counter-
factual thought experiment. If the military academies were to allow
cadets and midshipmen to participate in every aspect of academy life
yet opt for civilian jobs upon graduation, and most of the minority
students underrepresented in the officer corps were to choose civilian
life, then student body diversity would produce robust discourse
benefits without leadership benefits. Conversely, if selective civilian
schools allowed underrepresented minorities to enroll exclusively in
courses with overwhelming minority populations, to reside in racially
concentrated housing, to participate exclusively in minority-centric
extracurricular activities, and informally to avoid even casual
interaction with non-minorities on campus, and a large proportion of
underrepresented minorities in fact chose to segregate themselves in
these ways, then there would be negligible discourse benefits to
student body diversity.110 But the satisfaction of an interest gauged by
racial diversity in the numbers of graduates assuming leadership
positions in nationally prominent non-educational institutions would
be unaffected.
III.
Let us return to the doctrinal clarification of the diversity test I
offered at the beginning of this Essay. A compelling state interest in
student body diversity exists when the higher educational unit (1) has
identified the "educational benefits" diversity is "designed to
produce" and shows (2) that attaining those benefits is "essential to its
educational mission," and (3) that student body diversity does in fact
produce those mission-essential benefits.1 1 With respect to discourse
benefits, the test seems at first easily satisfied: "the robust exchange
of ideas" is at the core of a university's (in the ideal, universal sense)
educational mission and such discourse produces documented
educational benefits on campus and beyond.
It should be evident that certain kinds of educational units can
110. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2348, 2349-50 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Scalia explained:
Still other suits may challenge the bona fides of the institution's expressed
commitment to the educational benefits of diversity .... [T]empting targets,
one would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of
tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses-through minority-only
student organizations, separate minority housing opportunities, separate
minority student centers, even separate minority-only graduation
ceremonies.
Id. at 2349-50. A possible rejoinder to Justice Scalia is that even if such self-
segregation were to result, the phenomenon itself would promote potentially
beneficial discourse on the subject of racial interaction on campus.
111. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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make a better claim to discourse benefits than others because their
educational mission is more closely associated with the exchange of
ideas in which differing racial perspectives would be relevant. For
example, the curricula at liberal arts colleges, law schools, public-
policy schools, business-management schools, or graduate
departments in sociology and comparative literature, deal with issues
and subject matter to which different racial experiences are deeply
relevant. By contrast, undergraduate engineering schools, military
academies, graduate programs in theoretical physics or mathematics,
and medical schools are not so focused on subjects usefully
illuminated by racial inflections. As Justice Powell put it in Bakke:
"It may be argued that there is greater force to these views [in the
interest of student body diversity] at the undergraduate level than in a
medical school where the training is centered primarily on
professional competency." '112
Of course, that is not to say that a school in the latter category can
make no claim whatsoever to seeking and conferring the discourse
benefits of a diverse student body. No educational institution, not
even a military academy, which is simultaneously an educational and a
military installation,"3 says that its mission does not value the
discourse benefits of student body diversity at all." 4 As Justice Powell
observed with respect to medical schools:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise
qualified medical student with a particular background-whether it
be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged -may
bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and
ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its
112. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313 (1978).
113. As such, the military service academy occupies an interesting intersection
between the civilian university institution and its robust First Amendment rights, see
supra Part I, and the military base, where national security trumps most First
Amendment rights, see, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) ("The notion
that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally
served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private
citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false."); id. at 843 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("[The] enclave of a [military] system ... stands apart from and outside of
many of the rules that govern ordinary civilian life in our country.").
114. See, e.g., Overview of the Academy, available at
http://www.usma.edu/admissions/overview.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). The
overview explains:
Each year the United States Military Academy admits 1,150 to 1,200 young
men and women. These new members of the cadet corps come from all
corners of the United States and represent nearly every race, religion and
culture in the country. Nurtured by the West Point environment, this
diversity of background helps cadets gain a cultural as well as a rich
educational experience.
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graduates to render with understanding their vital service to
humanity. 1
5
Likewise, the experiences and views of minority cadets and
midshipmen, while not so important in close-order drill, naval
propulsion systems class, or celestial navigation, are certainly valuable
in academy and ROTC classes on leadership, ethics, politics, and
history. Furthermore, there is always interaction on campus outside
of the classroom, say, at the dormitory, or through sports or other
extracurricular activities. All of this, however, is consistent with my
point: depending on the nature of a specific educational institution,
there is variation in the degree to which student body diversity is
sought to produce, and in fact produces, discourse benefits.
Determining the leadership diversity benefits of a diverse student
body at different sorts of institutions is more complicated in certain
respects and easier in others. It would be easier, as we have seen, if
we look to institutional articulations of mission and apply a strict
causal test, limiting the claim to leadership benefits to educational
units that assert diverse student bodies as a necessary (like law
schools) or a sufficient (like military academies) cause of racially
diverse leadership in nationally sensitive non-educational institutions.
One self-evident additional element of the benefits test in the
leadership context would be the requirement of postulating a
compelling need for racial diversity in the leadership of the target
non-educational institution or profession.
A successful claim under this "strict" test would be something like
the following: The mission of the military academies is to train
officers. Military academy cadets and midshipmen automatically
become officers upon graduation. A diverse officer corps is a
compelling need for the military to perform its nationally sensitive
mission.
Or, the mission of law schools is to train lawyers, who form the
exclusive pool of those who may become federal judges. Law school
students become lawyers upon graduation (when they pass the bar).
There is a compelling need for a diverse federal judiciary given the
diverse social context in which legal issues arise.
A closer call under a strict test would be the sort of claim that
business schools might make. A principal mission of the business
school is to train corporate managers. If we are to have a racially
diverse corporate leadership, we must have racially diverse student
bodies at selective business schools. It is nationally important to have
racially diverse corporate leadership because many corporate workers
are minorities and because the global business environment is a multi-
racial one.
A closer case yet might be medical schools. Medical doctors must
115. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
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graduate from medical school. Diverse student bodies are therefore
necessary for a racially diverse medical profession, but is a diverse
medical profession a compelling national need? Perhaps so, because
medical treatment is as much about social understanding and wisdom
as it is about science.
To be fair, one could imagine a more general form of "strict" test
for the twenty percent of the nation's top colleges that use affirmative
action, even given the increasing importance of subsequent graduate
or professional education to becoming a member of the nation's
leadership cadre. A principal mission of selective colleges like the
members of the Ivy League is to "mold" leaders of society at large in a
general way.116 If we are to have racial diversity in the leadership of
the nation, we must have racial diversity in the Ivy League.
The crucial difference between this articulation and the others is the
inability of the civilian college educational unit to make a more
precise claim of leadership mission and effect, that a diverse student
body will lead to diversity in the leadership of a specific institution or
profession in which there is a compelling need for racial diversity.
The claim of an elite college to a leadership-production function may
have an undeniable commonsense appeal, and it may be causally
accurate, albeit in a weak sense." 7 But this sort of generalized, open-
ended claim to prospective social benefit, like its retrospective remedy
counterpart-the interest in remedying "societal" as opposed to
institutional discrimination, which was held to be unconstitutional in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education' 18 -is simply too protean to
merit incorporation in a substantive legal test, particularly one that is
meant to be as exacting as the compelling interest standard. If an
argument for student body diversity is decisive on the basis of an
assertion of prospective general societal benefit, it is hard to see the
conditions under which that argument might fail.
To sum up, then, different institutions of higher learning seek and
confer the educational benefits of student body diversity to varying
degrees. Military academies seek diverse students for a diverse officer
corps and in fact produce it, but they are not so much interested in
discourse benefits although obtaining such benefits is part of their
116. See, e.g., Oldenburg, supra note 109 ("For more than three centuries, Yale has
seen its job as educating future leaders-from the fourteen Yalies who served on the
Continental Congress and four signers of the Declaration of Independence to four of
the past six U.S. presidents (the two Bushes; Bill Clinton, Yale Law '67; and Gerald
Ford, Yale Law '41."). It is interesting to point out that of the modern Yalies who
have become president in recent times, two were products of its law school, and
George W. Bush was also a graduate of Harvard Business School, a top professional
school. Moreover, George H.W. Bush was a 1948 graduate of Yale College-a
member of a generation of leaders for whom graduate and professional education was
not as important as it is in the twenty-first century.
117. See supra note 103.
118. 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). The Grutter Court did not purport to disavow
Wygant.
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mission. Law schools strongly seek and produce both the discourse
and institutional leadership benefits of a diverse student body;
business schools do so as well, although possibly less so on both
dimensions. Medical schools make the weakest argument of the
professional schools to both institutional leadership and discourse
benefits, but they can field arguments on both fronts nonetheless.
Colleges can make the strongest claim to discourse benefits, but no
real claim to institutional or professional leadership benefits on a
national level.
Should those discourse benefits be enough to find a compelling
state interest in student body diversity at the few selective public and
private colleges that use affirmative action? The Court in Gratz
assumed so,119 and Justice Powell in Bakke said so,12° but neither
considered the broader context of the enterprise of higher education
in the United States. The most salient aspects of higher education in
America today are the accelerating proliferation of graduate and
professional schools that are the gate-keepers to leadership in our
increasingly specialized society, and the fact that there are many more
non-selective colleges which as a group lose highly qualified minority
candidates to the select group of prestigious undergraduate schools.
CONCLUSION
"Diversity," understood in the normative sense as an associative
virtue, 21 is the paradoxical celebration of difference under the
common and equal condition of humanity. Racial or ethnic diversity
is the celebration of difference in race or ethnic origin among human
beings. It is a relative newcomer to the American canon of values, 22
119. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
120. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
121. I call "diversity" an associative virtue because it is a good achieved only in the
context of mutual interaction, like "friendship" by contrast to virtues like "self-
mastery" which are personally realized though in a social or political context. That is
not to say that diversity as an associative value does not have its analogue in strictly
personal virtues, such as the idea of human dividedness at the root of Isaiah Berlin's
thought.
122. The first chief justice of the Supreme Court was one of many founders who
believed that homogeneity, and not diversity, was the desired norm:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one
united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles
of government, very similar in their manners and customs.... This country
and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if
it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and
convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties,
should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous and alien
sovereignties.
The Federalist No. 2, at 9 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Early twentieth-
century American immigration statutes, which established quotas on immigration by
national origin that discriminated most against Asian immigrants, reflected to some
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coincident with the post-Second World War, post-colonial acceptance
of racial diversity as an inalterable yet benign (i.e., consistent with
fundamental equality) fact of the human condition and qualified
rejection of its antinomy, racial homogeneity, as a normatively
compelling form of social ordering.123
The sense of diversity as a virtue has special importance for a multi-
racial nation. All nations, whether racially heterogeneous or
homogeneous, must deal with the external descriptive condition of
racial diversity in the world community at large, but a multi-racial
nation must confront it as an issue of internal governance. 124 The issue
takes on particular salience when racial differences correlate to
inequalities of socioeconomic wealth and political power, and it is
even more urgent when the dynamics of population growth are such
that have-not races are reproducing at greater rates than the haves.
Uncorrected, race-correlated material inequities might lead to social
instability and national decline. Skillfully managed, the condition of
stable internal racial diversity should also give the multi-racial nation
a comparative advantage over non-diverse nations in its external
relations with a diverse yet increasingly intertwined world.
Our institutions of higher learning, as a class, occupy a special place
in the potential for realization of racial diversity (in its normative
sense) for two related reasons. They are a principal means by which
citizens are taught social values such as the virtue of racial diversity.
These are the discourse benefits I have talked about, and they have to
do with how all citizens, regardless of race, view society and life. Our
universities are also an important training ground for the leaders of a
racially diverse society in which higher education is a virtual necessity
for significant socioeconomic and political advancement. This gate-
keeping function means that for the nation to have the benefit of
leadership diversity, it must have minorities at its universities. It
follows as a logical matter that racial diversity among student
populations at our colleges and universities is potentially a compelling
government interest, to ensure representation both of minority
extent the resilience of the countervailing norm of racial homogeneity. The national-
origin system continued to be a prominent feature of the 1952 Immigration and
Naturalization Act, and was only abolished in 1965. Similarly, state-sponsored
segregation enforced a de facto hierarchical accommodation of racial diversity that is
inconsistent with the fundamental human equality across races that is a premise of the
present multi-racial diversity norm.
123. 1 say "qualified," because racial or ethnic group self-determination may be the
only option in the context of states with intractable histories of inter-ethnic tension.
But no mainstream American leader, whether progressive or conservative, contends
that a return to racial homogeneity is the answer to multi-racialism in the present
United States population. Even for the fringe segregationist, the solution would
presumably be the hierarchical bifurcation of society by apartheid, not expulsion or
eradication of heterogeneous races.
124. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 1024-25 (1996).
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viewpoints and experiences on campus and of racial minorities in our
leadership elites upon graduation. The very best schools say that they
must have race-based admissions policies to enroll the highly qualified
minority applicants necessary to achieve the compelling interest in
racially diverse student bodies.
In fact, these same elite educational institutions have marked
differences in mission and emphasis, owing to the many needs of the
society they serve and the corresponding scale of the higher
educational enterprise as a whole. The highly selective military
academies, for example, seek student body diversity more for the sake
of leadership diversity in the nation's armed forces than for the
benefit of a robust exchange on campus of ideas formed by racially
diverse experiences, which is the principal aim of the selective
undergraduate schools that are their civilian counterpart. While
selective civilian undergraduate institutions may convincingly claim
that they seek student body diversity to produce the campus and
societal benefits of diverse discourse, and that courts should defer to
their educational judgment that these benefits are compelling, they
are not so clearly entitled to claim that they consciously seek to train
institutional and professional leaders on a national level-military
officers, judges, politicians, and corporate executives.
Nor can elite colleges claim that undergraduate student body
diversity causes the benefit of institutional and professional leadership
diversity in anything other than a very general, hence legally suspect,
way. Not only is such specialized training in tension with the
fundamental mission of the liberal arts college institution, the
individuals or electorates who govern access to leadership in
nationally sensitive institutions like the federal judiciary, the Senate,
and corporate boardrooms, (the nation's officer corps being the
unique and important exception), may promote racial diversity on
their own without regard to whether a person went to an elite college.
More important for our purposes, it is increasingly the case that those
who seek leadership positions in institutions of national importance
must obtain further, specialized training at graduate and professional
schools that have, as a class, the narrow educational mission of
leadership and professional diversity.
Yet even in terms of the admittedly important benefit of diverse
discourse, the case for a compelling state interest in student body
diversity at elite colleges is problematic, notwithstanding the Court's
summary acquiescence on the point in Gratz.'25 The self-interested
argument of the few selective public and private undergraduate
schools that employ affirmative action is that without it, they must
reject highly qualified minority applicants at the cost of meaningful
student body diversity on their campuses. This means that with
125. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
20041 2327
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
affirmative action at the elite colleges, those less selective colleges
(among the remaining eighty percent of all colleges) with very few
minority students have no chance to enroll these same highly qualified
minority candidates, at the expense of their own presumptively
compelling interests in student body diversity. And even those less
selective undergraduate programs with sufficiently diverse student
populations as it is will suffer a qualitative loss in their campus
discourse because of the flight of highly qualified minority students to
elite colleges engineered by affirmative action. 26 It might not be fair
to require a private college with government funding to answer for the
costs of this tradeoff between the elite and non-elite colleges in
compelling government interest analysis, but surely, a state with a
portfolio of public institutions of higher learning ought not to be
afforded the same latitude.2 7 And if the benefit of diverse discourse
at elite public colleges alone does not suffice as a compelling state
interest, it seems necessary to reach the same legal conclusion for
their private counterparts, to preempt the latter from cherry-picking
all highly qualified minority college students.
Is it better, then, to allow affirmative action at our most prestigious
colleges so that they may each achieve robust student body diversity,
or to dilute the concentration of highly qualified minority candidates
at elite colleges, sharing them with less prestigious schools and doing
away with affirmative action altogether at the undergraduate level?
This seems to me a very hard question. On the one hand, to the
extent that the causal claim of elite colleges to leadership diversity is
right,2 8 the latter choice would diminish the direct representation of
racial minorities in the leadership of nationally sensitive institutions
and, also, would lessen the exposure to undergraduate-campus
126. My point here necessarily presumes that minority students who are "highly
qualified" in an academic sense make a greater contribution to discourse benefits
than less qualified students. Concededly, this need not be true, because less qualified
minority students might have more diverse life experiences to share with majority
students on campus. However, to the extent highly qualified students might have
better oral and written communications skills, they may be more adept at discourse,
notwithstanding the comparative homogeneity of their experiences. In any event, the
connection between high qualifications and desired discourse benefits is an implicit
presumption of race-conscious admissions policies at elite universities, which do not
purport to give preferences, ceteris paribus, to merely qualified minority students.
127. I would think that how this plays out in practice is complicated, because a
State might reasonably choose to invest in a nationally prominent "flagship"
university, including its undergraduate arms, as opposed to its other state institutions
of higher learning. That logic is somewhat undermined to the extent a national
reputation is made by the research and scholarship conducted by the faculty and
students of a public university's graduate and professional schools, which could
continue to employ affirmative action. Indeed, those graduate and professional
programs might be benefited by greater parity in state colleges and undergraduate
programs, which could serve as in-state feeder institutions to those programs.
128. See supra note 103.
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diversity of white and other students not benefited by affirmative
action who later become such leaders.
On the other hand, to the extent that graduate and professional
schools have displaced selective colleges as the crucial gate-keeping
educational units for leadership diversity (again, with the exception of
the military academies and ROTC for the military officer corps),
getting rid of undergraduate affirmative action while keeping it at the
graduate level would have little effect on leadership diversity but
considerable salutary effect for the national educational enterprise as
a whole. For one, it would give less prestigious colleges a better
chance to attract highly qualified minority candidates to shore up their
own compelling interest in student body diversity for its discourse
benefits. Such a two-tiered system would also encourage the top
graduate and professional schools to look for minority applicants from
a more diverse universe of undergraduate institutions, for example,
historically black institutions like Hampton University, or less
prestigious public schools with large populations of under-represented
minority students like Virginia Commonwealth University129 and
private such schools like Temple University.13 And in so doing, elite
graduate and professional schools might develop a familiarity with
these undergraduate programs that would increase the chances of
outstanding non-minority graduates to get in. The end result would
be greater diversity in the undergraduate backgrounds of minority and
non-minority students at the very best graduate and professional
schools 3 -- the new gate-keepers to leadership diversity, an important
corollary of which would be elimination of the "double-counting"
effect of affirmative action, i.e., the cultivation of a super-elite of
minority students benefiting from affirmative action twice by being
accepted at an elite college and again at a top graduate or professional
school. 32
129. Virginia Commonwealth University Freshman Profile (reporting that twenty
percent of incoming freshmen in 2003 are African-American), available at
http://www.vcu.edu/ugrad/admissions101/freshmn-profile.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2004).
130. Temple University Fall 2002 Student Profile (reporting that nineteen percent
of incoming freshmen in 2002 were African-American), available at
http://www.temple.edu/factbook/profile02/profile.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
131. And to the extent this means that more minority students who attended
historically black colleges or less prestigious undergraduate schools with different
sorts of student populations attend graduate and professional schools, it would
increase the quality of diverse discourse on the campuses, since divergent
undergraduate experiences are valuable life experiences in themselves.
132. A cursory examination suggests that the concentration of elite college
graduates (presumably including many minority students for which no data is publicly
available) at top graduate schools may be staggering. Harvard Law School, for
instance, reported 1,669 full-time JD students enrolled in 2002-2003, with 268
undergraduate schools represented. See JD: Undergraduate Schools of J.D. Students
Enrolled at HLS in 2002-2003, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/admissions/jd/body.php. But an astonishing forty-six
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The Court's lack of clarity about the diversity rationale illuminates
just how difficult it is to operate an important social value like
"diversity" into a workable legal rule that can in turn be applied to a
vast, shifting social institutional landscape while remaining faithful to
the underlying value. 33  The difficulty is compounded by the
powerful, seemingly countervailing norm of formal racial equality,
guarded by its own formidable doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause.
It is no wonder, then, that the Court, inspired by the virtues of
diversity and the specific value of student body diversity lauded by
forces as disparate as university dons and warrior chieftains,
articulated a doctrine that does not quite fit the rich fabric of fact.
This Essay has been an attempt to add some precision to the Grutter
Court's diversity analysis, but, at bottom, its theme is unoriginal:
"Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause.""13
percent of the student body (767 students) were graduated from eleven colleges: the
eight Ivy League schools, Stanford, Duke, and Berkeley. Indeed, Harvard (189) and
Yale (101) Colleges together accounted for more students (290) than 190
undergraduate schools combined (289). See generally Elizabeth Bernstein, Want to
Go to Harvard Law, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at W1 (ranking colleges in terms of
their success in placing graduates at prestigious business, medical, and law schools,
with Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, and Williams at the top of the rankings).
133. But see Karst, supra note 19, at 74 (noting that despite the uncertainty
surrounding the decision, "it does offer a starting point for those who would be more
race-conscious in their efforts to do racial justice, both in politics and in constitutional
law").
134. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (citing Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960) ("[I]n dealing with claims under broad
provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive process of
inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified
by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in
disregard of variant controlling facts.").
